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Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax 
Theorem. Inter alia, this theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value—what 
rational players should expect to get.
Almost 80 years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as 
the basic question of value is concerned. To be sure, we do have equilibrium theories: the initial 
concept of John F. Nash (1951) and its various refinements and coarsenings. But when the game 
is not two-person zero-sum, none of these theories actually tells the players what to expect. Even 
when there is just one Nash equilibrium, it is not at all clear that the players “should” expect 
its payoff.
1 Can one ascribe a value to each player—what she should expect—in an arbitrary n-
  person game?
As stated, the question has no answer; the problem is underspecified. Formally, a game is 
defined by its strategy sets and payoff functions. But in real life, many other parameters are 
relevant; there is a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastly different may never-
theless correspond to precisely the same strategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democ-
racy with three parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether the parties each hold a third 
of the seats in parliament, or, say, 49 percent, 39 percent, and 12 percent, respectively. But the 
political situations are quite different. The difference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their 
expectations about each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules of the game do not 
distinguish between the two situations. Another example revolves around the ultimatum game 
(Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze 1982), which, when played in different 
cultures, leads to systematically different outcomes (Alvin E. Roth et al. 1991).
Thus, if one is given only the abstract formulation of a game, one cannot reasonably hope 
for an expectation. Somehow, the real-life context in which the game is played must be taken 
into account. We are discussing not just a game, but a “game situation,” i.e., a game played in a 
specific context; and we should be prepared to let a player’s expectation depend upon the con-
text—the “situation.”
1 For example, see Example IIIB.
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Call the player in whose expectation we are interested the protagonist, and designate her
2 
player 1 (P1). The essential element in the above notion of “context” is the protagonist’s belief 
about the actions and beliefs of the other players. These are described by a belief hierarchy: her 
belief about what the others play, about what they believe she—and the others—play, about what 
they believe about that, and so on. Formally, therefore, we define a game situation G to consist 
of (a) a strategic game G as defined by its strategy sets and payoff functions, and (b) a belief 
hierarchy of P1 in G; we say that G is based on G and G underlies G.
To start with, each game situation has a well-defined expectation: the protagonist’s expected 
payoff, as calculated from her strategy and her belief about the strategies of the others. But in 
itself, this doesn’t get us very far: without further restrictions, even two-person zero-sum game 
situations may well have expectations that are very far from the value. Indeed, they may be any-
thing at all between the protagonist’s maximum and minimum payoffs.
To achieve a meaningful extension of von Neumann’s value, we must take into account the 
interactive nature of games: that the players are rational, and reason about each other. This may 
be done by restricting attention to game situations with common knowledge of rationality (cKR) 
and common priors (cp).
3 The relevance of these two conditions to the value problem is brought 
out by
THEOREM A: the expectation of any two-person zero-sum game situation with common 
knowledge of rationality and common priors is the value of the underlying game.
Both cKR and cp are needed here; without either one, the result fails (Section IV, A and B). 
It is thus natural to define a rational expectation
4 in a game G as the expectation of a game situ-
ation based on G for which cKR and cp obtain. In Section IVD, we relate this definition to the 
classical notion of rational economic expectations, as originally promulgated by John F. Muth 
(1961).
What Theorem A says is that in two-person zero-sum games, rational expectations are not 
situation-specific: any such expectation must be the value of the game. But in general, rational 
expectations are situation-specific. Here, we investigate the set of rational expectations that can 
arise in situations based on a given game G; i.e., the restrictions on such expectations that are 
implied by the formal definition of the game itself, whatever the specific situation may be.
On the face of it, the task of operationally calculating these expectations appears formida-
ble; inter alia, because of the complexity of belief hierarchies. It is made approachable by our 
Theorem B, which characterizes the rational expectations in terms of the correlated equilib-
ria (Aumann 1974) of the doubled game 2G—which is the same as G, except that each of the 
protagonist’s strategies is listed twice.
5 To state it, recall that a correlated equilibrium of G is a 
probability distribution r on pure strategy profiles (a.k.a. n-tuples), such that if “chance” chooses 
a profile in accordance with r, and informs each player only of his strategy in the chosen profile, 
then it is optimal for him to play that strategy, assuming that the others play their strategies. The 
protagonist’s expected payoff, after being told which strategy to play, is called a conditional 
2 The protagonist is female. The other players are of indeterminate gender; to distinguish them from the protagonist, 
we use masculine pronouns for them. Similarly, we use masculine pronouns for players in general, who may or may 
not include the protagonist.
3 A player is rational if his strategy choice maximizes his expected payoff. cKR means that all players are rational, 
all know it, all know that, and so on. Roughly, cp means that differences in the players’ probability assessments are 
due to differences in information only; for a precise definition, see Section I. If cKR—or cp—obtain, then all players 
know it, so it can be read off from the protagonist’s belief hierarchy.
4 This definition is not used in Enrico Minelli (1995).
5 Doubling a game affects its correlated equilibria in a nontrivial way; they are not just doubled versions of the cor-
related equilibria of the original game.mARch 2008 74 thE AmERIcAN EcONOmIc REVIEW
  payoff to r (because it is conditional on her information, namely the strategy). Correlated equi-
libria are described by a limited number of explicit linear inequalities; 
6 so they, and the corre-
sponding conditional payoffs, are explicitly describable in terms of G. We then have
THEOREM B: the rational expectations in a game G are precisely the conditional payoffs to 
correlated equilibria in the doubled game 2G.
The above presentation contains the gist of the paper. The remainder is organized as follows: 
Section I discusses belief hierarchies, and characterizes them in terms of our main conceptual 
tool—that of belief system. Some auxiliary propositions are stated in Section II, and an alter-
native formulation of Theorem B appears in Section V. Section IV discusses two-person zero-
sum games; in particular, it argues that the classical justifications for the value in such games 
(von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 1944) are less than convincing. Numerical examples are 
adduced in Sections III and IV. Section VI provides intuitions for Theorems A and B. Section 
VII discusses the relation of our concept to earlier work of Aumann (1987), which seems to give 
a different answer to the same question (VIIA), and to Nash equilibrium (VIIB). Section VIIC 
interprets rational expectations as “benchmark” outcomes of games; Section VIID relates them 
to Muthian rational expectations. Section VIII is devoted to the background and literature, and 
Section IX concludes. The Appendix provides formal proofs.
I.  Belief Hierarchies and Belief Systems
Formally, a (strategic) n -person game G consists of n finite sets s1, s2,  …  , sn (the strategy 
sets of the players) and n functions h1, h2,  …  , hn from s 5 s1 3 s2 3 … 3 sn to R (the payoff 
functions). A belief hierarchy is most easily represented by means of a belief system
7 B for G 
consisting of
 (i)  For each player i a finite set ti whose members ti are called types of i; and
  (ii)  For each type ti of each player i:
  (a)  A strategy
8 of i in G denoted si1ti2; and
  (b)  A probability distribution on (n 2 1)-tuples of types of the other players, called ti’s 
   theory.
It may be seen that a player’s type uniquely determines the whole hierarchy of his beliefs. 
Conversely, every belief hierarchy satisfying certain basic consistency conditions is the belief 
hierarchy of some type in some belief system (Jean-Francois Mertens and Shmuel Zamir 1985; 
see also Aumann and Heifetz 2002, sect. 8).
A common prior is a probability distribution p on t1 3 … 3 tn that assigns positive probabil-
ity to each type of each player, such that the theory of each type of each player is the conditional 
6 See Aumann (1987), Proposition 2.3. With two players having k and l strategies, respectively, there are k
2 2 k 1 
l
2 2 l inequalities in kl variables, plus the kl 1 2 inequalities that say that the probabilities are nonnegative and sum to   
one (no more and no less).
7 Originated by John C. Harsanyi (1967–1968).
8 Member of si—what is usually called a pure strategy. Mixed strategies play no explicit role in this treatment. If 
a player wishes to use a mixed strategy, say by tossing a coin, he may certainly do so; but then the type describes the 
situation after the coin toss.VOL. 98 NO. 1 75 AumANN AND DREzE: RAtIONAL ExpEctAtIONs IN GAmEs
of p given that that player is of that type.
9 Less formally, such that each player’s probability for a 
strategy profile is its probability under the common prior, conditioned on his information—i.e., 
on his being the type he is; examples are provided Section III. A type of a player is rational if the 
strategy it prescribes maximizes his expected payoff given its theory. Rationality is commonly 
known if this is so for all types of all players.
10 A belief system is rational if cKR and cp obtain. 
A rational expectation in G is an expected payoff of some type of the protagonist in some ratio-
nal belief system for G.
II.  Auxiliary Results
Our main results are Theorems A and B, stated in the introduction. The results in this section 
are used in analyzing the examples below, and in the proofs of Theorems A and B.
PROPOSITION C:
  (i)  Every conditional correlated equilibrium payoff—in particular, every Nash equilibrium 
payoff—is a rational expectation.
 (ii)  Rational expectations are unchanged by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies.
  (iii)  Every rational expectation is at least the protagonist’s maxmin payoff.
11
 (iv)  the rational expectations are covariant under multiplication of a player’s payoffs by a 
positive constant, and under addition of a constant to a player’s payoffs for fixed strategies 
of the other players.
Item (i) says that the notion of rational expectation is weaker than that of Nash or even cor-
related equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is strong enough to yield the value in two-person zero-sum 
games (Theorem A). Proposition C follows from Theorem B; for item (iv), we note that these 
transformations do not change the correlated equilibria.
To state the next proposition, recall that Roger B. Myerson (1997) called a game elementary 
if it has a correlated equilibrium that assigns positive probability to each strategy of each player, 
and all the inequalities associated with this equilibrium are strict.
12 We then have
PROPOSITION D: Every elementary game has a maximum rational expectation, namely the 
(protagonist’s) highest payoff at any strategy pair.
Finally, we have
PROPOSITION E: If all correlated equilibrium payoffs are the protagonist’s minimax payoff v, 
then v is the only rational expectation.
9 In symbols, pi1t
2i; ti2 5 p1t2/p1ti2 for each i and each t in t1 3 … 3 tn where pi 1 ? ; ti2 is ti’s theory and t
2i is the 
(n 2 1)-tuple of types assigned by t to players other than i.
10 This is equivalent to the definition in terms of iterated knowledge given in the introduction.
11 That is, it is her security level, what she can guarantee to herself when using mixed strategies.
12 That is, if a player is informed that the chosen strategy profile calls for him to play a certain strategy, then it is 
strictly better for him to choose that strategy than any other strategy. Myerson showed that, in a certain sense, all games 
may be “reduced” to elementary games.mARch 2008 76 thE AmERIcAN EcONOmIc REVIEW
III.  Examples
In the two-person games below, the 
row and column players are Rowena 
and Colin, respectively. Rowena is the 
protagonist.
A. Rational Expectations may Be 
mutually Inconsistent
The game G in Figure 1A (“Chicken”) has three Nash equilibria: two pure, yielding (2, 7) 
and (7, 2), and one mixed, yielding (42/3, 42/3). Consider now a belief system with four states, 
TL, TR, BL, and BR, with each player’s probabilities for each state in each state as depicted in 
Figures 1B and 1C. For example, in BL as well as in BR, Rowena’s probabilities for BL and BR 
are 7/8 and 1/8 respectively, while for TL and TR they are 0. Rowena has the two types t and B, 
Colin the two types L and R.
The expectation of Rowena’s type B is 61/8. She attributes probability 1/8 to Colin’s type being 
R, in which case his expectation, too, will be 61/8. So in that case, the players will each expect 
61/8. These expectations are mutually inconsistent; (61/8, 61/8) is infeasible—it is outside the con-
vex hull of the possible payoff vectors. And this in spite of common knowledge of rationality, 
which the reader may verify, and the existence of a common prior, depicted in Figure 1D.
BR is the conflict outcome in Chicken. We see here that conflict may occur even when the play-
ers reason perfectly rationally and attribute rationality to each other; both players know about 
the inconsistency, and indeed it is commonly known that it may occur. Contrary to common wis-
dom (or rather, foolishness), the conflict is not due to 
any irrationality, but simply to differing assessments, 
which may well ensue when players are provided with 
different information.
To be sure, the mixed Nash equilibrium may also 
lead to conflict. But in that case, the players’ assess-
ments of the situation are not inconsistent. It is the 
inconsistency of the assessments that is noteworthy 
here.
The distribution in Figure 1D is a correlated equilib-
rium of G, and 61/8 is its conditional payoff given B.
Another belief system for G is depicted in Figures 1E–1G. Here, it is common knowledge that 
the conflict outcome BR is impossible. In particular, a type B Rowena expects 7 and knows that 
Colin is of type L, so expects 4. The payoff pair (7, 4) is, however, infeasible. Thus here again, 
the expectations of the players are mutually inconsistent, in spite of there being no irrationality 
in the system.
B. Different conditional correlated Equilibrium payoffs in 2G and G
The game G of Figure 2A (Lloyd S. Shapley 1964) has a single Nash 
equilibrium, namely, ((1/3,  1/3,  1/3), (1/3,  1/3,  1/3)), yielding the payoff (3, 3). 
Consider now a belief system with seven states, t1R, t2c, t2R, mL, mR, BL, 
and BC, with each player’s probabilities set forth in Figures 2B and 2C (as 
in Section IIIA); Rowena’s strategy in rows t1 and t2 is t. If Rowena’s type 
is t1, the game situation has expectation 5. She knows that Colin’s type is R, 
Figures 1A through 1D
L  R L R L R L R
t 6, 6  2, 7 t 1/2 1/2 t 1/2 7/8 t 7/22 7/22
B 7, 2 0, 0 B 7/8 1/8 B 1/2 1/8 B 7/22 1/22
Figure 1A Figure 1B Figure 1C Figure 1D






L  R L R L R
t 1/2 1/2 t 1/2 1 t 1/3 1/3
B 1 0 B 1/2 0 B 1/3 0
Figure 1E Figure 1F Figure 1G






Figures 1E through 1G
L  c R
t 0, 0 4, 5 5, 4
m 5, 4 0, 0 4, 5
B 4, 5 5, 4 0, 0
Figure 2A
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so that his expectation is 41/2. Thus Rowena 
knows that the players’ expectations are the   
infeasible
13 pair (5, 41/2)—in spite of common 
knowledge of rationality and a common prior 
(depicted in Figure 2D). Here, unlike in the 
previous example, 5 is not a conditional pay-
off to a correlated equilibrium of G, given any 
strategy of Rowena.
14
But it is a conditional payoff to a corre-
lated equilibrium of the doubled game 2G, 
depicted in Figure 2E; the correlated equilib-
rium in question is depicted in Figure 2F. Note that if we eliminate 
the rows in which all the probabilities vanish, Figure 2F becomes 
Figure 2D. A similar relationship obtained in our first example, but 
with G instead of 2G.
Alternatively,  a  correlated  equilibrium  of  this  game  may  be 
obtained by assigning probability  1/6 to the entries with payoffs   
(4, 5) or (5, 4). The associated inequalities are all strict, so the game 
is elementary. So by Proposition D, the maximum rational expecta-
tion is 5.
C. the set of Rational Expectations  
Need Not Be convex
15
In each of the previous two examples adduced up to 
now, the set of rational expectations is an interval. In the game G of Figure 3, this 
is not so; here, there are precisely two rational expectations: 1 and 0.
IV.  Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) advance two arguments to support the 
minmax value of two-person zero-sum games. One is the equilibrium argument; the other is the 
guaranteed value argument, which says that the row player can guarantee getting the value v, 
and the column player can guarantee not paying more than v, “so” rational players must reach 
precisely the value.
The equilibrium argument is of a formal, mathematical nature; one proves that there is a 
unique equilibrium payoff, namely the value. But the guaranteed value argument is more tenu-
ous. We purposely put the word “so” in quotation marks, because there is a bit of a non sequitur 
there. Fully to justify this kind of argument, one needs a formal framework. In fact, though this 
“argument” appears to depend only on the rationality of the players, it is not true that players who 
13 The payoffs sum to 91/2, whereas the maximum sum in the matrix is 9.
14 By G’s symmetry, we may suppose that Rowena’s component of the strategy pair is t. The correlated equilibrium 
cannot then assign positive probability to tc, as Rowena’s conditional payoff would then be , 5. So everything is 
eliminated by a sequence of strict dominations: c by L, then B by m, then L by R, then m by t, and finally R by c, 
leaving nothing. In fact, the highest conditional payoff to a correlated equilibrium of G, given a strategy of Rowena, is 
5 2 11/31262 < 4.99968.
15 By contrast, with an ex ante viewpoint, as in Section VIIA, one gets the set of all unconditional correlated equi-
librium payoffs, which is always convex.
0, 0 4, 5 5, 4 0 0 1/12
0, 0 4, 5 5, 4 0 1/6 1/12
5, 4 0, 0 4, 5 1/6 0 1/6
5, 4 0, 0 4, 5 0 0 0
4, 5 5, 4 0, 0 1/6 1/6 0
4, 5 5, 4 0, 0 0 0 0






Figures 2E and 2F L  R
t 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 3
The game G
L  c R L c  R L c  R
t
1 0 0 1 t
1 0 0 1/4 t
1 0 0 1/12
t
2 0 2/3 1/3 t
2 0 1/2 1/4 t
2 0 1/6 1/12
m 1/2 0 1/2 m 1/2 0 1/2 m 1/6 0 1/6
B 1/2 1/2 0 B 1/2 1/2 0 B 1/6 1/6 0
Figure 2B Figure 2C Figure 2D
Rowena’s beliefs Colin’s beliefs The common prior
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are merely rational must necessarily reach the value; one needs common knowledge of rational-
ity, and one also needs common priors (see Section IV, A and B).
One may think of Theorem A as reflecting the guaranteed value argument, but in a rather sub-
tle way. The players do not actually guarantee the value. In many two-person zero-sum games,
16 
it is in fact impossible to do so in pure strategies; and here, we think of the players as using 
pure strategies only. Rather, the protagonist expects the value. Guarantees enter the argument 
in showing that what she expects cannot be less than the value, because she could—by using 
mixed strategies—attain at least the value in expectation. One needs further arguments, revolv-
ing around the common knowledge, the common prior, and the zero-sumness to show that she 
also cannot expect more than the value.
Indeed, the current perspective shows exactly where the “classical” argument breaks down. It 
is true that Players 1 and 2 can guarantee v and 2v, respectively; so, since the sum of payoffs is 
0, the only feasible “individually rational”
17 payoff pair is (v, 2v). It is also true that any rational 
expectation (of either player) must be individually rational, that is, Proposition C (iii). What is 
not generally true is that the players’ expectations must constitute a feasible pair, i.e., be “con-
sistent.” Indeed, we saw in Section III that inconsistent expectations are the rule rather than the 
exception; in particular, we saw that it is possible for Rowena to know that Colin expects a payoff 
that is inconsistent with the payoff she knows she is getting, even though rationality is commonly 
known and there is a common prior. On the face of it, there is no reason to suppose that a similar 
situation could not arise also in two-person zero-sum games.
But in fact, it cannot. Theorem A says that there is something special about two-person zero-
sum games that makes it impossible. So this theorem goes considerably beyond the classical 
“guaranteed value” argument for the value.
As for the equilibrium argument, this is addressed in Section VIIB, where we discuss Nash 
equilibrium in general n-person games.
A. Failure of theorem A without common priors
The game G is “matching pennies.” With the depicted belief system—which has no common 
prior—it is common knowledge that it is optimal for each player to play that strategy with which 
his type is designated. In particular, Rowena’s type t plays t and expects 0.8, whereas the value 
of the game is 0.
Careful consideration of the example leads to some discomfort. It is commonly known that 
Rowena believes
18 that Colin believes that Rowena does the opposite of what she really does—
and vice versa,
19 i.e., that each player ascribes grave errors to the other. This is typical of situa-
tions without common priors. Common knowledge of rationality does obtain in this example.
B. Failure of theorem A without cKR
Figure 5 depicts a common prior for a belief system in the game “matching pennies” (see 
Figure 4A). Type L3 of Colin is irrational, but all other types of both players are rational. So, type 
t1 of Rowena is rational, knows that Colin is rational, knows that he knows that she is rational, 
knows that he knows that she knows that he is rational, and knows that he knows that she knows 
that he knows that she is rational; moreover, t1’s expectation is 1, whereas the value of the game 
16 Specifically, unless the game has a pure strategy saddle point.
17 This means that each player gets at least what he can guarantee to himself.
18 Short for “ascribes probability 0.9 to.”
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is 0. The example can be extended to an arbitrarily 
high level of iterated mutual knowledge of rationality; 
but, by Theorem A, not to common knowledge.
V.  An Alternative Formulation of  
Theorem B
Theorem B is stated in terms of the doubled game 
2G. It can also be stated in terms of a set of “aug-
mented” games, in each of which a single strategy of 
the protagonist is “doubled.” Thus, given a strategy r1 
of the protagonist in G, define the augmented game 
G2r1 as the n-person game in which just r1 is replaced 
by  two  copies,  and  the  payoff  does  not  depend  on 
which copy is used. We then have
THEOREM B9: Rational expectations in the game G 
coincide with conditional correlated equilibrium pay-
offs in the augmented games G2s1, where s1 ranges over the protagonist’s strategies.
Thus, a is a rational expectation in G if and only if the protagonist has a strategy s1 such that 
in the augmented game G2s1, there are a correlated equilibrium r and a strategy such that a is the 
conditional payoff to r given that strategy.
VI.  Intuitions for Theorems B9, B, and A
Two intuitions underlie our results: (i) that the common prior probability of a rational belief 
system (henceforth RBS; see Section I) B in a game G is essentially the same thing as a cor-
related equilibrium (CE) of a game GB closely related to G—that in which each strategy of 
each player appears as many times as there are types that play that strategy in B; and (ii) that 
the conditional expectation of a strategy in a CE does not change when other strategies that are 
“identical”—i.e., have the same payoffs no matter what the other players do—are amalgamated. 
Amalgamation of identical strategies in a CE of a game means going to the corresponding CE of 
a game in which the amalgamated strategies are replaced by a single strategy, inheriting as prior 
probabilities the sums of the prior probabilities before amalgamation.
By (i), every rational expectation in G is a conditional correlated equilibrium payoff in GB. 
Define a game G2s1 by amalgamating in GB all “identical” strategies other than some specified 
strategy s1 of the protagonist, retained twice. Then by (ii), a conditional CE payoff in GB for 
strategy s1 is also a conditional CE payoff in G2s1 for s1. This yields Theorem B9, and Theorem 
B follows.
Finally, let G be a two-person zero-sum game with value v. Call Player 1 Rowena, Player 2 
Colin. Let t1 be a type of Rowena in an RBS. Rowena has a mixed strategy m that yields $ v 
against any pure strategy of Colin, and so also against her belief under t1 of how he plays. So at 
least one of her pure strategies must yield an expectation $ v under that belief. So by cKR, the 
strategy prescribed by t1 must also yield $ v; thus, all types of Rowena expect $ v. Similarly, all 
types of Colin expect $ 2v; so the average of all of Colin’s payoffs under the common prior p 
is $ 2v. If some type of Rowena would expect . v, then the average of all of Rowena’s payoffs 
under p would be . v, contradicting the zero-sumness. So all types of Rowena expect exactly v, 
as Theorem A asserts.
L1 L2 R1 R2 L3
t1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0
B1 0.1 0 0.1 0 0
B2 0 0.1 0 0.1 0
t2 0 0 0.1 0 0.1
t3 0 0 0 0.1 0.1
Figure 5 
 The common prior
L  R L R L R
t 1, 21 21, 1 t 0.9 0.1 t 0.1 0.9
B 21, 1 1, 21 B 0.1 0.9 B 0.9 0.1
Figure 4A Figure 4B Figure 4C
The game G Rowena’s beliefs Colin’s beliefs
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VII.  Discussion
A. Ex Ante and Interim Viewpoints
Economists distinguish three stages in differential information environments. Ex ante, no one 
has any private information; in the interim, each agent has his private information only; ex post, 
all information is revealed to all. In our context, ex ante the protagonist knows only the belief 
system B—which is commonly known by all players; in the interim, each player knows his type, 
but not those of the others; ex post, each player knows the types of all players.
Some readers may be curious about the relationship of the current work to Aumann (1987), 
which appears to make the same assumptions—cKR and cp—but reaches distinctly differ-
ent conclusions.
20 Namely, the 1987 paper arrives at unconditional expectations of correlated 
equilibria (CEs) of the given game G; here, we arrive at conditional expectations of CEs of the 
doubled game 2G.
The puzzle is solved by noting that the 1987 paper concerns the possible ex ante expectations, 
under which the alternative interim situations are weighted by their probabilities under the common 
prior. In contrast, this paper characterizes all possible rational expectations at the interim stage.
In practice, the interim viewpoint is the more important. Almost invariably, real players have 
differential information. What they would have expected had they not had the information that 
they do have may be of theoretical interest, but has little practical significance. So with all due 
respect to the 1987 paper, we consider the current one more significant. Needless to say, the 1987 
paper was an indispensable stepping stone.
B. Nash Equilibrium
A major argument for Nash equilibrium, advanced already by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944), is that if game theory is to recommend strategies to the players in a game, then those 
recommendations must constitute a Nash equilibrium. When carefully examined, the argument 
breaks down. It assumes that the putative “recommendation of game theory” must be for each 
player to play some specified (mixed or pure) strategy, known to all players. But game theory 
need not make that kind of recommendation; its recommendation could be—indeed, should 
be—“respond optimally to your private information.” The players are faced with a game situ-
ation, not just a game. Even when the game is commonly known, the game situation usually is 
not. It is, indeed, replete with private information, which the players ignore at their peril (see, 
e.g., Section IIIA).
Nash equilibrium is of central importance in studying norms of strategic behavior,
21 and we do 
not suggest abandoning it as a solution concept for strategic games. But for the one-shot game, 
rational expectations are more fundamental.
C. Rational Expectations as a Benchmark
Any reasonably intelligent child knows that tic-tac-toe “is” a draw—that that is the “right” 
outcome of the game. That is not to say that in real life she would always play for a draw; she 
might play for a win, and lose (or win!), even while knowing that the game “is” a draw.
20 Indeed, many who have been present at preliminary presentations of this material have expressed puzzlement on 
this matter.
21 In his thesis, Nash (1950, 21–22) suggested the related concept of “mass action” as an interpretation of his 
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The formal expression of this is that the value of tic-tac-toe is a draw. Similarly, in any two-
person zero-sum game, the value is the “right” outcome. In n-person game situations, rational 
expectations capture this idea.
The building blocks of rational expectations—cKR and Cp—are rarely literally true in real 
life. Nor are they in any sense normative: in a given situation, they either hold or they do not hold; 
it makes no sense to say that they “should” hold. Nevertheless, they constitute the appropriate 
benchmark—characterize the “right outcomes”—just like in tic-tac-toe.
D. Relation with muthian Rational Expectations
In his classic 1961 paper, John Muth characterized expectations as “rational” if they are “essen-
tially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory” (316). In games, the “relevant 
theory,” whatever it is, certainly “predicts” simple rationality—utility maximization—on the 
part of the players. Thus with rational expectations, each player expects all players to be rational. 
So the “relevant theory” predicts not only simple rationality on the part of all players (R), but also 
mutual knowledge of rationality (KR), i.e., that all players know
22 all players to be rational. But 
then all players “expect”—or know—KR; so the “relevant theory” predicts not only KR, but also 
K
2R. Continuing in this way, we get K
mR for all m, which amounts to cKR. So in games, Muth’s 
rational expectations comprise cKR.
What about cp? One might think of the “relevant theory” as yielding a probability distri-
bution p on the strategies and beliefs of the players—i.e., on their types. If an analyst is then 
informed of player i’s type, his “prediction” will be the conditional of p given that type. With 
rational expectations, i himself, who is indeed informed of his type, will have the same expecta-
tions, or beliefs, as the prediction of the informed analyst: the conditional of p given his type. 
But his beliefs are his theory (in the technical sense of “theory”; see Section I, (ii)(b)). So his 
theory is the same as the conditional—which is precisely cp.
VIII.  Background and Literature
The theory presented in this paper differs from much of the strategic game literature in that it 
does not deal with equilibria; rather, it recommends that a player in a game, like in a one-person 
decision problem, should simply maximize against her subjective probabilities for the other play-
ers’ actions. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957, 306) were among the earliest to consider 
this approach. They wrote that in a game, “one modus operandi for the decision maker is to gen-
erate an a priori probability distribution over the … pure strategies … of his adversary by taking 
into account both the strategic aspects of the game and … ‘psychological’ information … about 
his adversary, and to choose an act which is best against this … distribution.”
Joseph B. Kadane and Patrick D. Larkey (1982) expressed a similar view, but unlike Luce 
and Raiffa (1957), they eschewed the “strategic aspects.” This ignores the fundamental insight 
of game theory, an insight that is captured by the idea of rational expectations introduced here: 
that a rational player must take into account that the players reason about each other in deciding 
how to play.
While the theory presented here is new, to a large extent it flows naturally from previous devel-
opments in game theory. First was von Neumann’s (1928) minimax for two-person zero-sum 
games; this led to Nash’s (1951) strategic equilibrium; this, in turn, to correlated equilibrium; 
and this, to the theory of rational expectations presented here. The crucial idea here is to analyze 
22 To be sure, this glosses over the difference between “expecting” and “knowing.” In any case, the discussion here 
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game situations rather than games—to view games from “inside,” without common knowledge 
of the situation—and it is Harsanyi’s (1967-1968) theory of types that enables this.
IX.  Conclusion
The fundamental object of study in game theory should be the game situation G rather than 
its underlying game G. In game situations, the recommendation of game theory is precisely that 
of one-person decision theory: choose your strategy to maximize your expected payoff, given 
your information. But unlike in one-person decisions, rational players should take account of the 
interactive nature of games—that all the players are rational, and reason about each other. Here, 
this notion is captured by restricting attention to game situations with common knowledge of 
rationality and common priors. We characterize, directly in terms of the underlying game G, the 
expectations that may result under this restriction; and show that in two-person zero-sum games, 
the only such expectation is von Neumann’s value of the underlying game.
Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF THEOREM B9:
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LEMMA 4: cKR obtains in B9.
PROOF:
We must show that in B9, the strategy of each type maximizes that type’s expectation. For types 
of players j other than i, this is immediate, since their (conditional) expectations are the same in 
B9 as in B, whether or not they play the strategies prescribed by their types. The same holds for 
types ui of i other than u
0
i. For i’s type u
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if he plays some other strategy ri , i.e., since the denominators are the same in the two expres-
sions, that



















But by the same token, the optimality (in B2 of si1t
1
i 2 for t
1
i and of si1t
2
i 2 for t
2
i yield







































and, by (1) and (3), adding (6) and (7) yields (5). This establishes Lemma 4.
COROLLARy 8: Amalgamation does not affect the expectation of any type of any player, except 
for the types that have been amalgamated.
Let a be a rational expectation in G; we must prove that it is a conditional correlated equilib-
rium payoff in one of the augmented games. By definition of “rational expectation,” there is for G 
an RBS B, and a type u1 of the protagonist whose expectation is a. Let r1 :5 s11u12 be the strategy 
played by type u1. Without loss of generality, there is another type—different from u1 —who 
plays r1. For if not, we may split u1 into two identical types, with the same strategy and theory as 
u1. The new common prior (after the split) is then obtained from the original one by halving the 
probabilities of all states affected by the split.
Repeatedly amalgamating types and using Lemma 4 and its corollary, we arrive at an RBS B0 
with a common prior p0, such that (i) for each strategy of each player—other than r1 —at most 
one type plays that strategy; (ii) the protagonist has a type u
1
1 that is “like” u1, in that it plays the 



















1. Hence p0 induces a probability distribution r on the strategy profiles in G2r1, it being 
understood that strategy profiles without a counterpart in Bs are assigned probability 0.
LEMMA 9: r is a correlated equilibrium in G2r1.
PROOF: 
CKR in B0 tells us that the expectation of any type is at least as great if it plays the strategy 
prescribed for that type, as if it plays some other strategy. Rephrasing, any strategy in G2r1 with 
positive r-probability yields to its player a conditional expected payoff under r at least as great 
as any other strategy.
By Lemma 9 and Corollary 8, a is a conditional correlated equilibrium payoff in G2r1. This 
completes the proof of Theorem B9 in one direction.
23 Obtained by amalgamating all the types of the protagonist who play r1 other than u
1
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In the other direction, let b be a conditional correlated equilibrium payoff in an augmented 
game G2r1, specifically, the conditional payoff to the correlated equilibrium r, given some strat-
egy s1 in G2r1. Define a belief system B for G as follows: the types of i in B are in one-one cor-
respondence with those of his strategies in G2r1 to which r assigns positive probability; the theory 
of a type is the conditional of r given the strategy corresponding to that type. Then r is a com-
mon prior for B, and that CKR holds in B is the same as saying that r is a correlated equilibrium 
in G2r1. This completes the proof of Theorem B9.
PROOF OF THEOREM B:
If a is a rational expectation in G, then by Theorem B9, it is a conditional payoff to a correlated 
equilibrium r9 in some augmented game G2r1, given a strategy x9 of the protagonist in that game. 
The strategy profiles in G2r1 are in one-one correspondence with those strategy profiles in 2G 
whose first component either is either one of the two copies of r1 in 2G, or is the first copy of a 
strategy other than r1. Assigning to any such profile the r9-probability of the corresponding pro-
file in G2r1, and 0 to all other profiles, yields a correlated equilibrium r in 2G. The strategy x9 in 
G2r1 corresponds to some strategy x in 2G, and then a is the conditional payoff to r in 2G given 
x. This completes the proof of Theorem B in one direction.
In the other direction, let b be a conditional payoff to a correlated equilibrium r in 2G, given a 
strategy x of the protagonist; let r1 be the strategy in G of which x is a copy in 2G. “Amalgamating” 
the two copies in 2G of all strategies other than r1 yields a correlated equilibrium r9 in G2r1, and 
turns x into a strategy x9 in G2r1. Then b is a conditional payoff to r9 in G2r1, given x9. So by 
Theorem B9, b is a rational expectation in G. This completes the proof of Theorem B.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION C:
  (i)  The first part follows from Theorem B, as every correlated equilibrium in G can also be 
viewed as a correlated equilibrium in 2G, since one can simply assign probability 0 to one 
of the two duplicates of each of the protagonist’s strategies. The part about Nash equilib-
rium follows from the fact that at a Nash equilibrium n, all “active” strategies of the protag-
onist (indeed, of any player)—i.e., those with positive probability at n —must get the same 
payoff, so that the conditional expected payoffs coincide with the total expected payoff.
 (ii)  Follows from the fact that a strictly dominated strategy can never appear with positive prob-
ability in a correlated equilibrium, as it is always worthwhile to switch to the dominating 
strategy.
  (iii)  Let a be a rational expectation, t
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    where q and r range over all probability distributions over s21 and s1, respectively.
 (iv)  Follows from Theorem B, since correlated equilibria are covariant in the required manner.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION E:
Proposition C(iii) says that every rational expectation is $ v. Suppose a is a rational expec-
tation that is . v. From Theorem B it follows that a is a conditional payoff of a correlated VOL. 98 NO. 1 85 AumANN AND DREzE: RAtIONAL ExpEctAtIONs IN GAmEs
  equilibrium r in the doubled game 2G. By Proposition C(iii) and Theorem B, all other condi-
tional payoffs to r in 2G are $ v. Since the unconditional payoff to r is the expectation of the 
conditional payoffs, and a appears in this expectation with positive probability, it follows that 
the unconditional payoff to r is . v. But an unconditional payoff to the correlated equilibrium r 
in 2G is also an unconditional payoff to a correlated equilibrium in G, obtained by amalgamat-
ing duplicated strategies. So we get a correlated equilibrium payoff in G that is . v, contrary to 
hypothesis.
PROOF OF THEOREM A:
Follows from Proposition E, since in two-person zero-sum games, the (unconditional) expected 
payoff to every correlated equilibrium is the value.
24
PROOF OF PROPOSITION D:
By definition, the given game G has a correlated equilibrium m that assigns positive prob-
ability to each strategy of each player, and in which the associated inequalities are strict. Let s 
be the set of strategy profiles in G. If i assigns equal probabilities to all strategy profiles, and e 
. 0 is sufficiently small, then l :5 11 2 e2m 1 ei assigns positive probability to each strategy 
profile, and the associated inequalities are still strict. Let w be a strategy profile in G that yields 
the protagonist her highest payoff in G. For each strategy profile s in G, let s
1 and s
2 be the two 
copies of s in 2G. Let 0 , d , lw. Define a probability distribution r on the set 2s of strategy 
profiles in 2G by rs1 :5 ls , rs2 :5 0 for s Z w, and rw1 :5 lw 2 d, rw2 :5 d. We will show that r is 
a correlated equilibrium of 2G when d is sufficiently small.
Indeed, the inequalities associated with r in 2G are the same as those associated with l in G, 




1 in 2G. Since d is small, and the inequalities cor-
responding to w1 in G are strict, those corresponding to w
1
1 in 2G still hold. As for w
2
1, if the pro-
tagonist is informed of w
2
1, she knows for sure that she will get the highest possible payoff in the 
whole game if she indeed plays w
2
1, so it certainly is not worthwhile for her to switch. Therefore, 
r is indeed a correlated equilibrium of 2G.
It then follows from Theorem B that the conditional payoff corresponding to w
2
1 is a rational 
expectation. This conditional payoff is the protagonist’s payoff in G at w, which is her highest 
payoff at any strategy pair.
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